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Abstract 
Despite often making `conventional claims’ for asylum based on their political opinion, race, 
nationality or religion, many women also claim asylum in the United Kingdom (UK) on the basis 
that they fear persecution because of their gender. To be recognised as refugees, women asylum 
seekers must therefore often demonstrate that they fear persecution on account of their 
membership of a Particular Social Group (PSG). In the UK, the Refugee Convention ground of 
PSG is the most litigated, and women asylum seekers may face many obstacles to benefitting 
from the protection they require. This paper explores the development of the interpretation of the 
PSG ground in the context of gender-related claims for asylum and assesses its implication for 
the protection of women who fear gender-related persecution. In particular, it sets out a critical 
analysis of the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal’s determination in SB (Moldova)1 in light of 
the House of Lords’ decision in Fornah.2  
The paper demonstrates the Tribunal’s failure to follow the decision of the majority in Fornah 
that the two limbs of article 10(1)(d) Qualification Directive, setting out the definition of a PSG, 
are alternatives and not cumulative and why this determination is flawed. The paper also 
concludes that the Tribunal has developed a more rigorous test for the definition of PSG where 
the group is gender-based despite the absence of domestic and international jurisprudence and 
rules of interpretation that would support this approach. The analysis highlights the 
discriminatory approach by the Tribunal and demonstrates that this approach cannot stand.  
 
Keywords: Particular Social Group, women, gender-related persecution, protection, 
discrimination, Qualification Directive 
                                                          
1 SB (PSG - Protection Regulations – Reg 6) Moldova CG [2008] UKAIT 00002. The Asylum and Immigration 
Tribunal was replaced by the Immigration and Asylum Chamber in February 2010. 
2
 Secretary of State for the Home Department v K; Fornah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] 
UKHL 46, 18 October 2006. 
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In 2010, one third of asylum applications in the UK were lodged by women and this proportion 
has remained constant since 2003.3 Whereas many women may have “conventional” claims for 
asylum based on their political opinion, religion, race or nationality, many fear persecution solely 
because of their gender, including because they refuse to conform to established gender roles 
within a given society.4 Women may also be subjected to harm which is gender-specific such as 
rape and sexual violence, forced sterilisation, female genital mutilation (FGM) and domestic 
violence.5 However, the Refugee Convention6 fails explicitly to define a refugee as someone 
who fears gender-related persecution because there was a lack of understanding that individuals 
may suffer different forms of persecution for different reasons when the Refugee Convention 
was drafted.7 Therefore, to be recognised as refugees in the UK, women must often demonstrate 
that they fear persecution on account of their membership of a particular social group (PSG) 
because the proposition that any violence against women is political has not yet, as such, found 
enough support.8  
 
This paper sets out the legal definition of PSG by considering the two main approaches to the 
interpretation of PSG, namely the protected characteristics and the social perception approaches. 
It will then evaluate the manner in which UK courts and Tribunals interpret this Convention 
ground in cases of women asylum seekers who flee gender-related persecution. More 
specifically, it will consider the Tribunal’s unwillingness to consider the two PSG approaches as 
alternatives and its insistence that there be an additional element of discrimination in gender-
related asylum claims. The paper highlights the tensions between the higher courts and the 
Tribunals of the Immigration and Asylum Chamber and the resulting effect on the protection of 
women who flee gender-related persecution in the UK.    
 
 
Interpretation of the Refugee Convention 
 
A refugee is defined in the Refugee Convention as a person who: 
 
Owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside his 
country of nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear is unwilling to avail himself 
of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the 
country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing 
to such fear is unwilling to return to it.9 
                                                          
3 Home Office, Immigration Statistics, April to June 2011: Asylum, Table as.03: Asylum applications from main 
applicants by age, sex and country of nationality. 
4 Immigration Appellate Authority, Asylum Gender Guidelines, November 2000. 
5 UK Border Agency, Asylum Instruction on Gender Issues in the Asylum Claim, September 2010. 
6 Article 1A, 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. 
7 Edwards A. `Age and Gender dimensions in international refugee law´, in Refugee Protection in International 
Law: UNHCR’s Global Consultations on International Protection, edited by E. Feller, V. Türk and F. Nicholson, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 80. 
8 Goodwin-Gill G. and McAdam J. The Refugee in International Law, 3rd Edition, pp. 81-82. Edwards, `Age and 
Gender dimensions in international refugee law´, p. 68. 
9 Article 1A, 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. 
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The travaux préparatoires of the Refugee Convention show very little debate on the inclusion of 
PSG as a Convention ground.10 The ground was suggested by the Swedish delegate who stated 
that social group cases existed and that the Convention should explicitly recognize this.11 As 
pointed out in Australian jurisprudence by McHugh J in Applicant A: 
 
Courts and jurists have taken widely differing views as to what constitutes 
"membership of a particular social group" for the purposes of the Convention. This is 
not surprising. The phrase is indeterminate and lacks a detailed legislative history 
and debate. Not only is it impossible to define the phrase exhaustively, it is pointless 
to attempt to do so.12 
 
There is little in the drafting materials which may assist in the interpretation of a PSG and it is 
thus unsurprising that various jurisdictions have adopted different methods to define a PSG. 
Courts in the UK, Australia, Canada and USA have often considered the jurisprudence from 
other jurisdictions nonetheless. Yet, even within the UK, courts have struggled to agree on the 
correct approach and adopt a consistent interpretation of this Convention ground. 
 
The definition of a refugee should be interpreted in a manner having regard to gender dimensions 
as gender is not explicitly included as a ground for refugee protection.13 The preamble of the 
Refugee Convention states that the purpose of the Convention is “to assure refugees the widest 
possible exercise of these fundamental rights and freedoms […] without discrimination”. The 
concept of a PSG must therefore be interpreted consistently with the object and purpose of the 
Refugee Convention.14 The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) has 
submitted that the ordinary meaning of the term PSG “contains no inherent limitation on the 
range of factors which can serve to distinguish a group of persons from society at large”.15  
 
Despite evidence showing that in a majority of Western states there is a “general recognition of 
the fundamental validity” of gender-related claims, there are still problems regarding the 
                                                          
10 Hathaway J. and Foster M. `Membership of a particular group: Discussion paper No.4: Advance Refugee Law 
Workshop, International Association of Refugee Law Judges, Auckland, New Zealand, October 2002´, in 
International Journal of Refugee Law, 2003, 15(3), p. 477. 
11 Goodwin-Gill G. The Refugee in International Law, 2nd Edition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 46. 
12 A v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs [1997] HCA 4; (1997) 190 CLR 225; (1997) 142 ALR 331 (24 
February 1997).  
13 UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection: Gender-Related Persecution within the context of Article 1A(2) 
of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, 2002, para. 2. Edwards, `Age 
and Gender dimensions in international refugee law´, pp. 79-80. 
14 Islam v Secretary of State for the Home Department; R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Another, ex parte 
Shah [1999] UKHL 20, 25 March 1999. UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection: “Membership of a 
particular social group” within the context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol 
relating to the Status of Refugees, 2002, para. 2. 
15 UNHCR’s Intervention: Islam (A.P.) v Secretary of State for the Home Department Regina v Immigration Appeal 
Tribunal and Another, Ex Parte Shah (A.P.) (Conjoined Appeals), Case for the Intervener, 25 March 1999. 
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understanding of women’s specific experience of persecution and the interpretation of PSG.16 
The UNHCR has provided helpful guidance in defining a PSG by stating that: 
 
A particular social group is a group of persons who share a common characteristic 
other than their risk of being persecuted, or who are perceived as a group by society. 
The characteristic will often be one which is innate, unchangeable, or which is 
otherwise fundamental to identity, conscience or the exercise of one’s human rights.17 
 
As highlighted by Baroness Hale in Fornah, despite the fact that sex or gender is not included as 
one of the Convention grounds and that the proposal to include sex in the list of factors of the 
non-discrimination clause at article 3 of the Refugee Convention was opposed, it was 
nevertheless agreed at the 2001 San Remo Expert Roundtable that:  
 
The refugee definition, properly interpreted, can encompass gender-related claims. 
The text, object, and purpose of the Refugee Convention require a gender-inclusive 
and gender-sensitive interpretation. As such, there would be no need to add an 
additional ground to the Convention definition.18  
 
 
Approaches to the Convention ground of membership of a Particular Social Group 
 
In international jurisprudence there are two approaches to determining whether a particular social 
group exists.19 The first approach is the “protected characteristic” or “immutability” one, which 
requires the group to share an immutable characteristic or a characteristic so fundamental to their 
human dignity that it should not be denied.20 This doctrine of ejusdem generis was found to be 
the most helpful by the House of Lords in the case of Shah and Islam.21 Ejusdem generis literally 
means “of the same kind” and is a rule of construction which may assist in defining a general 
term following in a list of particular terms and which should be interpreted in a manner 
consistent with the general nature of the enumerated items.  
 
                                                          
16 Yahyaoui Krivenko E. `Muslim women’s claims to refugee status within the context of child custody upon 
divorce under Islamic Law´, in International Journal of Refugee Law, 2010, 22(1), p. 49. 
17 UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection: “Membership of a particular social group”, 2002, para. 11. 
18 Secretary of State for the Home Department v K; Fornah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] 
UKHL 46, 18 October 2006, para. 84. 
19 Baroness Hale of Richmond described both tests in her judgment in the case of Secretary of State for the Home 
Department v K; Fornah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] UKHL 46, 18 October 2006 at 
paragraph 99. 
20 Matter of Acosta, A-24159781, United States Board of Immigration Appeals, 1 March 1985; Canada (Attorney 
General) v Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, Canada: Supreme Court, 30 June 1993. 
21 Macdonald I. QC and Toal R. Macdonalds’s Immigration Law & Practice, 7th Edition, (London: LexisNexis, 
2008), p. 847. The House of Lords in the case of Islam v Secretary of State for the Home Department; R v 
Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Another, ex parte Shah [1999] UKHL 20, 25 March 1999, found that women in 
Pakistan constituted a PSG, both Mrs Shah and Mrs Islam had been accused of adultery, Mrs Islam had also been 
subjected to domestic violence. 
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In the USA, courts have used the ejusdem generis rule of construction to interpret membership of 
a particular social group since the case of Matter of Acosta.22 In Matter of Acosta, the Board of 
Immigration Appeals established that particular social groups are comprised of individuals who 
share a common characteristic that they cannot change, or should not be required to change 
because it is fundamental to their individual identities or consciences. The Board came to this 
conclusion by analogy with the other Convention grounds, namely that they all concerned 
characteristics that are either immutable or fundamental to an individual’s identity. The Board of 
Immigration Appeals expressly recognized gender as one such characteristic. By applying this 
principle, the Board of Immigration Appeals has recognized PSGs based on gender, tribal and 
clan membership, sexual orientation, family (parents of Burmese student dissidents), and past 
experiences (former member of national police).23  
 
The second approach is the “social perception” one which requires that society sets the group 
apart from society as a whole.24 As explained by UNHCR and accepted by the Lords in Fornah:   
 
If a claimant alleges a social group that is based on a characteristic determined to be 
neither unalterable or fundamental, further analysis should be undertaken to determine 
whether the group is nonetheless perceived as a cognizable group in that society. So, for 
example, if it were determined that owning a shop or participating in a certain 
occupation in a particular society is neither unchangeable nor a fundamental aspect of 
human identity, a shopkeeper or members of a particular profession might nonetheless 
constitute a particular social group if in the society they are recognized as a group 
which sets them apart.25  
 
Referring to the drafting history of the term “particular social group”, McHugh J said that: 
 
It follows that, once a reasonably large group of individuals is perceived in a society as 
linked or unified by some common characteristic, attribute, activity, belief, interest or 
goal which itself does not constitute persecution and which is known in but not shared 
by the society as a whole, there is no textual, historical or policy reason for denying 
these individuals the right to be classified as "a particular social group" for Convention 
purposes.26  
 
                                                          
22 Matter of Acosta A-24159781, United States Board of Immigration Appeals, 1 March 1985. 
23 Aleinikoff A. `Protected characteristics and social perceptions: an analysis of the meaning of ‘membership of a 
particular social group’´, in Refugee Protection in International Law: UNHCR’s Global Consultations on 
International Protection, edited by E. Feller, V. Türk and F. Nicholson, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003. 
24 Applicant A v Minister of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 CLR 225. 
25 UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection: “Membership of a particular social group”, 2002, para. 13 and 
Secretary of State for the Home Department  v K, Fornah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] 
UKHL 46, para. 15. Ms Fornah was 15 years old when she claimed asylum in the UK on the basis that if returned to 
Sierra Leone she would be at risk of FGM. The House of Lords found that (intact) women in Sierra Leone are 
members of a PSG. 
26 Applicant A v Minister of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 CLR 225. 
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The proposition made by McHugh J is that the group can be large and it can also suffice that 
society as a whole perceives the group as linked or unified by some common characteristic.  
 
UNHCR believes that the two approaches should be reconciled in order to address protection 
gaps which can result from varying approaches to the interpretation of PSG.27 
 
It is accepted that a PSG cannot be defined by the persecution to which it is subjected.28 This 
would effectively make the definition of a PSG redundant as anyone who was persecuted by the 
state or by non-state actors in the absence of state protection would fall into this category and 
would be entitled to refugee status. Neither is there a requirement that the group share an element 
of cohesiveness, co-operation or interdependence.29 This concept first propounded in the US case 
of Sanchez-Trujillo in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals30 was unanimously rejected by the 
House of Lords in Shah & Islam. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized the weakness 
of their approach in the case of Hernandez-Montiel and rejected the need for the group to be 
cohesive and homogenous when they found that Mexican gay men with female sexual identities 
were members of a particular social group.31 Australian jurisprudence also rejected this approach 
in Applicant A. 
 
Further, there is no requirement for there to be a voluntary, associational relationship; its 
members need not be homogenous and it may include large numbers of persons.32 What is more, 
not all members of the PSG need to be persecuted.33 A wide definition of the group may help to 
avoid circularity arguments regarding the group being defined by the persecution.34 However, 
persecution itself may be a relevant factor in determining the visibility of a group in a particular 
society.35 
 
Establishing that an asylum seeker is a member of a PSG is but one of the elements required to 
be recognised as a refugee. Asylum seekers must also establish a reasonable likelihood that they 
are at risk of persecution on account of that Convention ground.36 This element of causation is 
met when membership of a PSG is an effective cause for the persecution; it need not be the only 
                                                          
27 UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection: “Membership of a particular social group”, 2002, para. 10. 
28 Islam v Secretary of State for the Home Department; R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Another, ex parte 
Shah [1999] UKHL 20, 25 March 1999. NS (Social Group – Women – Forced marriage) Afghanistan CG [2004] 
UKIAT 00328, para. 53. 
29 Islam v Secretary of State for the Home Department; R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Another, ex parte 
Shah [1999] UKHL 20, 25 March 1999. 
30 Sanchez-Trujillo v. Immigration and Naturalisation Service, 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986). 
31 Hernandez-Montiel v. Immigration and Naturalisation Service, 225 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2000). 
32 NS (Social Group – Women – Forced marriage) Afghanistan CG [2004] UKIAT 00328, para. 53. 
33 Islam v Secretary of State for the Home Department; R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Another, ex parte 
Shah [1999] UKHL 20, 25 March 1999, per Lord Steyn. 
34 Islam v Secretary of State for the Home Department; R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Another, ex parte 
Shah [1999] UKHL 20, 25 March 1999. 
35 Secretary of State for the Home Department v K; Fornah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] 
UKHL 46, 18 October 2006, para. 15. 
36 Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law, 2nd Edition, 1998, p. 364. 
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or primary reason.37 The nexus can be linked to either the motivation of the persecutors or to the 
absence of State protection in cases of non-state agents of persecution.38  
 
Discrimination  
 
There has been some disagreement about whether an element of discrimination is essential in 
establishing the existence of a PSG. If discrimination is an essential element, discrimination can 
be found where victims of persecution are being targeted because of distinguishing 
characteristics listed in the Convention grounds. Additionally, or alternatively, the element of 
discrimination is found in the state persecution or lack of state protection in cases of non-state 
actors of persecution. 
 
The Court of Appeal questioned the need for discrimination as a requirement for the existence of 
a PSG in cases where persecution emanated from non-state actors.39 In effect, the Court of 
Appeal was expressing the belief that the requirement of the group being set apart from society 
as established in the case of Shah and Islam may not be a condition in non-state actors of 
persecution cases. The Court of Appeal justified this finding by stating that references to non-
discrimination principles in the case of Shah and Islam was simply a manner to show that 
cohesiveness of the group was not an element of the definition.  
 
Furthermore, it would be circular to require the group to be defined by a certain degree of 
discrimination before considering whether the group is persecuted for that reason.40 In other 
words, as persecution of members of a PSG for reason of such membership is necessarily 
discriminatory, it would be senseless to require evidence of the discrimination before considering 
whether the persecution is for reason of membership of that PSG. Considering discrimination in 
the definition of a PSG may also result in the risk that the group is defined by the persecution to 
which it is subjected. The element of discrimination is therefore to be found in the persecution 
itself.41  
 
 
The UK’s interpretation of membership of a Particular Social Group 
 
In the UK, an asylum applicant is someone who “makes a request to be recognised as a refugee 
under the Geneva Convention on the basis that it would be contrary to the United Kingdom's 
                                                          
37 Secretary of State for the Home Department v K; Fornah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] 
UKHL 46, 18 October 2006, para. 17. 
38 Islam v Secretary of State for the Home Department; R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Another, ex parte 
Shah [1999] UKHL 20, 25 March 1999, per Lord Hoffmann. UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection: 
Gender-Related Persecution, 2002, para. 21. This is also reflected in the Directive of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of 
international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the 
content of the protection granted (recast), 2009/0164 (COD), article 9(3). The UK has decided not to opt-in to the 
recast Directive and thus continues to be bound by the original Qualification Directive. 
39 Secretary of State for the Home Department v Skenderaj [2002] EWCA Civ 567, para. 19. 
40 Secretary of State for the Home Department v Skenderaj [2002] EWCA Civ 567, para. 25. 
41 Secretary of State for the Home Department v Skenderaj [2002] EWCA Civ 567, para. 25. 
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obligations under the Geneva Convention for him to be removed from or required to leave the 
United Kingdom”.42 The implementation of the definition of a refugee is found in the 
International Protection Regulations 2006.43 The International Protection Regulations 2006 aim 
to transpose the EU Qualification Directive (QD) in the UK which lays down the minimum 
standards for the qualification of asylum seekers as refugees and the content of their rights.44  
 
One of the aims of the EU Qualification Directive is to adopt a common concept of PSG while 
allowing EU member states to adopt more favourable standards.45 Article 10(1)(d) QD provides 
that: 
I  Member States shall take the following elements into account when assessing 
the reasons for persecution …  
(d)  a group shall be considered to form a particular social group where in 
particular:  
[(i)]  members of that group share an innate characteristic, or a common 
background that cannot be changed, or share a characteristic or belief that is so 
fundamental to identity or conscience that a person should not be forced to 
renounce it, and  
[(ii)]  that group has a distinct identity in the relevant country, because it is 
perceived as being different by the surrounding society;  
 
This was transposed into the International Protection Regulations 2006 word for word except for 
the term “in particular” which was replaced by the term “for example”.46 There have been 
tensions between the different levels of the judiciary in the UK regarding the accurate 
interpretation of these provisions.47 There is extensive jurisprudence in the UK on the 
interpretation of a particular social group, most of which are cases dealing with gender-related 
claims for asylum. The interpretation of the Convention ground of a particular social group “has 
presented the courts with one of their greatest challenges in refugee law”48 and it is the most 
litigated Convention ground in the UK.49 
 
                                                          
42 Paragraph 327(a) Immigration Rules (HC 395). See also paragraph 334 Immigration Rules (HC 395) which 
contains some exceptions where refugees can be excluded from protection in the UK if they are a danger to the 
security of the UK or have been convicted of a particularly serious crime and constituting a danger to the community 
of the UK. 
43 Regulation 2 of The Refugee or Person in Need of International Protection (Qualification) Regulations 2006 (SI 
No 2525). 
44 Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third 
country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the 
content of the protection granted. 
45 Article 3 EU Qualification Directive. Secretary of State for the Home Department v K; Fornah v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department [2006] UKHL 46, 18 October 2006, para. 16.  
46 Regulation 6(1)(d) of The Refugee or Person in Need of International Protection (Qualification) Regulations 2006 
(SI No 2525). 
47 Macdonald QC and Toal, Macdonalds’s Immigration Law & Practice, 7th Edition, 2008, p. 848. 
48 Mark Symes and Peter Jorro, Asylum Law and Practice, 2010, Second Edition, para. 4.17. 
49 Macdonald QC and Toal, Macdonalds’s Immigration Law & Practice, 7th Edition, 2008, p. 847. 
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The House of Lords50 has fully endorsed the definition of PSG proposed by the UNHCR 
Guidelines.51 The House of Lords accepted UNHCR’s approach to gender according to which 
“sex can properly be within the ambit of the social group category, with women being a clear 
example of a social subset defined by innate and immutable characteristics, and who are 
frequently treated differently to men”.52 Lord Bingham said that if Article 10(1)(d) QD:  
 
Were interpreted as meaning that a social group should only be recognised as a 
particular social group for purposes of the Convention if it satisfies the criteria in both 
of sub-paragraphs (i) and (ii), then in my opinion it propounds a test more stringent 
than is warranted by international authority”.53  
 
Lord Brown also stated that the EU Qualification Directive and any regulations brought in under 
it should be interpreted consistently with the definition of a PSG contained in the UNHCR 
Guidelines.54 Lord Hope clearly set out that a PSG need not necessarily be perceived as such by 
the society in which it exists. More precisely, he adopted the approach of McHugh  J in 
Applicant S stating that it would be a mistake to require “recognition within the society 
subjectively that the collection of individuals is a group that is set apart from the rest of the 
community”.55 
 
Lord Brown and Baroness Hale agreed with Lord Bingham’s reasoning. Fornah therefore 
represents the decision of the majority of the House of Lords and is binding on all courts and 
Tribunals in England and Wales. 
 
Since Fornah, the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal has endorsed the House of Lords and 
UNHCR’s position on the need to reconcile both approaches.56 Nevertheless, the Asylum and 
Immigration Tribunal,57 in the case of SB (Moldova), failed to apply the judgment in Fornah that 
the two limbs of Article 10(1)(d) QD are alternatives on the basis that “the observations of their 
Lordships were obiter, although very persuasive, because it is clear that their Lordships did not 
decide the cases under regulation 6(1)(d) or Article 10(1)(d) of the Qualification Directive”.58 
                                                          
50 The House of Lords has since been replaced by the Supreme Court. 
51 Secretary of State for the Home Department v K; Fornah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] 
UKHL 46, 18 October 2006, para. 15. 
52 UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection: “Membership of a particular social group”, 2002, para. 12 and 
Secretary of State for the Home Department v K; Fornah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] 
UKHL 46, 18 October 2006, para. 15. 
53 Secretary of State for the Home Department v K; Fornah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] 
UKHL 46, 18 October 2006, para. 16. 
54 Secretary of State for the Home Department v K; Fornah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] 
UKHL 46, 18 October 2006, para. 118. 
55 Secretary of State for the Home Department v K; Fornah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] 
UKHL 46, 18 October 2006, para 46. 
56 MK (Lesbians) Albania CG [2009] UKAIT 00036, para. 350. 
57 It has now been replaced by the First-Tier and Upper Tier Tribunals of the Immigration and Asylum Chamber. 
58 SB (PSG - Protection Regulations – Reg 6) Moldova CG [2008] UKAIT 00002, para. 69. The 2006 Regulations 
came into force on 9 October 2006. The case of Fornah was heard on 17 and 18 July 2006 and the judgment handed 
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However, the observations in the House of Lords were not obiter. On the contrary, the findings 
of Lord Bingham59 and Lord Brown60 in Fornah were part of the ratio decidendi of the case and 
are a proposition of law which is therefore binding on all courts of England and Wales. Lord 
Bingham’s findings on the definition of a PSG are the reasons for his decision that women in 
Sierra Leone form part of a PSG. Had Lord Bingham not adopted UNHCR’s interpretation of a 
PSG he may not have come to the same conclusion.  
 
The Tribunal in SB (Moldova) considered in detail the interpretation of regulation 6(1)(d) of the 
International Protection Regulations 2006.61 The AIT stated that the word “and” should be given 
its “natural meaning” and therefore that the two limbs should be considered cumulative. 
However, this interpretation is problematic as this would be contrary to the need to adopt a 
holistic interpretation as required by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties having 
regard to the context, object and purpose of the treaty.62  
 
The Tribunal in SB (Moldova) also failed to understand that the EU Qualification Directive must 
be interpreted consistently with the Refugee Convention.63 Under EU law, national regulations 
must be interpreted to implement EU Directives.64 The recital to the EU Qualification Directive 
specifically states that a “full and inclusive” interpretation of the Refugee Convention is a 
cornerstone of the Common European Asylum System.65 The House of Lords stated that if the 
two approaches to PSG, namely the “protected characteristics” and the “social perception” were 
to be cumulative, the test would be more stringent than most international authorities, failing to 
reflect that the EU Qualification Directive represents minimum standards.66 It may therefore be 
problematic to take as a starting point the literal language of the International Protection 
Regulations 2006 when considering the interpretation of PSG.  
 
The reasoning of the Tribunal in this case is flawed because it is inconsistent with the House of 
Lords’ authority on how the EU Qualification Directive should be interpreted and it has resulted 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
down on 18 October 2006. However, and as explained above, the Lords considered Article 10(1)(d) QD which is 
transposed into the International Protection Regulations 2006 almost word for word. 
59 Secretary of State for the Home Department v K; Fornah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] 
UKHL 46, 18 October 2006, para. 15. 
60 Secretary of State for the Home Department v K; Fornah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] 
UKHL 46, 18 October 2006, para. 118. 
61 SB (PSG - Protection Regulations – Reg 6) Moldova CG [2008] UKAIT 00002, para. 70. This was clearly 
summarised in AZ (Trafficked women) Thailand CG [2010] UKUT 118 (IAC), para. 133. 
62 Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that “a treaty shall be interpreted in good 
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its 
object and purpose”.  
63 See recitals 2 and 3 of the EU Qualification Directive and as established in Secretary of State for the Home 
Department v K; Fornah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] UKHL 46, 18 October 2006. 
64 Article 288 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union stipulates that “a directive shall be binding, as 
to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national 
authorities the choice of form and methods”. 
65 Recitals 2 and 3 of the EU Qualification Directive.  
66 Secretary of State for the Home Department v. K; Fornah v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] 
UKHL 46, 18 October 2006, para. 16. 
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in a protection gap that affects women disproportionately because protection claims on the basis 
of membership of a PSG are more often made by women who fear persecution because of their 
gender.67 Other immigration judges in the Tribunal have since followed this interpretation.68 
 
 
Gender-related asylum claims and membership of a Particular Social Group 
 
The Tribunal in SB (Moldova) emphasised the importance it had placed on the need to examine 
whether a PSG exists within the context of a society in question.69 However, Lord Hope in 
Fornah emphasised that it was not necessary for society to recognise a PSG as being set apart 
from the rest of society.70 The Tribunal said that it did not make sense if “former victims of 
trafficking” or “former victims of trafficking for sexual exploitation” are, per se, members of a 
PSG without considering the evidence relating to the society in question.71 However, it may be 
said that persons of a certain nationality, race, religion or political opinion may be persecuted in 
one particular country but not in another. Indeed, a person may be a member of a PSG without 
necessarily being at risk of persecution.72 
 
Baroness Hale has recognised that it is possible for individuals who share a past experience, such 
as being the victims of sexual violence, to show they are linked by an immutable characteristic 
which is capable of being independent of the persecution and the cause of their current ill-
treatment.73 This was followed in more recent Tribunal decisions.74 However, it does not 
necessarily follow that the group is persecuted and the context of the society in question must be 
examined to establish whether the nexus between the persecution and the Convention ground is 
met.  
 
Discrimination 
 
In the case of Skenderaj, the Court of Appeal rejected the respondent’s submission that the PSG 
did not exist because “there was no setting apart or stigmatisation of, or discrimination against, 
the family outside the persecution alleged” because they “did not regard that as a necessary part 
of the definition of a PSG, particularly in a non-state persecution case”.75 Nevertheless, the 
                                                          
67 UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection: Gender-Related Persecution, 2002, para. 28. 
68 AZ (Trafficked women) Thailand CG [2010] UKUT 118 (IAC), para. 134. AM and BM (Trafficked women) 
Albania CG [2010] UKUT 80 (IAC), para 165, note however that the Tribunal in this case considered that the PSG 
would be identified in Albanian society by the actors of persecution amongst others, query whether this could be 
sufficient. 
69 SB (PSG - Protection Regulations – Reg 6) Moldova CG [2008] UKAIT 00002, para. 71. 
70 Macdonald QC and Toal, Macdonalds’s Immigration Law & Practice, 7th Edition, 2008, p. 856. 
71 SB (PSG - Protection Regulations – Reg 6) Moldova CG [2008] UKAIT 00002, para. 72. 
72 Secretary of State for the Home Department v. K; Fornah v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] 
UKHL 46, 18 October 2006, para. 113. UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection: Gender-Related 
Persecution, 2002, para. 31. 
73 Hoxha & Anor v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] UKHL 19 (10 March 2005), para. 37. 
74 AM and BM (Trafficked women) Albania CG [2010] UKUT 80 (IAC), para. 166. AZ (Trafficked women) Thailand 
CG [2010] UKUT 118 (IAC), para. 140-141. HC & RC (Trafficked women) China CG [2009] UKAIT 00027, para. 
36. 
75 Secretary of State for the Home Department v Skenderaj [2002] EWCA Civ 567, para. 30. 
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Tribunal in SB (Moldova) rejected the finding that discrimination is not an essential requirement 
for establishing the existence of a particular social group when the immutable characteristic is 
gender.76 The Tribunal in SB (Moldova) used the word “discrimination” in the wide sense of the 
term as “making distinctions which principles of fundamental human rights regard as 
inconsistent with the right of every human being to equal treatment and respect” and stated that 
“discrimination involves making unfair or unjust distinctions to the disadvantage of one group or 
class of people as compared with others”.77  
 
The Tribunal justified its departure from the Court of Appeal’s reasoning in Skenderaj by stating 
that: 
Whilst this judgment causes us some difficulty, our analysis is in line with the 
judgments of their Lordships in Shah and Islam and Fornah and K. Accordingly, if 
Auld LJ was saying that discrimination is not a necessary identifying characteristic 
of a gender-based social group, then we must respectfully disagree. Furthermore, the 
final sentence of paragraph 30 of the judgment appears to be at odds with Fornah 
and K.78 
 
However, although the Lords discussed the principle of discrimination in Shah and Islam and in 
Fornah, it is considered that this referred to the five Convention grounds themselves. Both Lord 
Bingham and Lord Hoffmann said that the Refugee Convention was only concerned with 
protecting persons who are at risk of persecution based on discrimination.79 On this basis, Lord 
Bingham found that: 
 
FGM may ensure a young woman's acceptance in Sierra Leonean society, but she is 
accepted on the basis of institutionalised inferiority [...] FGM is an extreme 
expression of the discrimination to which all women in Sierra Leone are subject, as 
much those who have already undergone the process as those who have not. I find no 
difficulty in recognising women in Sierra Leone as a particular social group for 
purposes of article 1A(2).80  
 
Lord Hoffman said that “discrimination against women in matters of fundamental human rights 
on the ground that they are women is plainly in pari materiae with discrimination on grounds of 
race”. Perhaps the most explanatory opinion of the role played by discrimination within the 
Refugee Convention was given by Lord Hope in Shah and Islam when he described 
discrimination as: 
 
A feature which is common to all five of the Convention reasons which are set out in 
the paragraph. The first preamble to the Convention explains that one of its purposes 
                                                          
76 SB (PSG - Protection Regulations – Reg 6) Moldova CG [2008] UKAIT 00002. 
77 SB (PSG - Protection Regulations – Reg 6) Moldova CG [2008] UKAIT 00002, para. 43. 
78 SB (PSG - Protection Regulations – Reg 6) Moldova CG [2008] UKAIT 00002, para. 66. 
79 Secretary of State for the Home Department v. K; Fornah v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] 
UKHL 46, 18 October 2006, para. 13. Islam v Secretary of State for the Home Department; R v Immigration Appeal 
Tribunal and Another, ex parte Shah [1999] UKHL 20, 25 March 1999. 
80 Secretary of State for the Home Department v. K; Fornah v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] 
UKHL 46, 18 October 2006, para. 31. 
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was to give effect to the principle that human beings shall enjoy fundamental rights 
and freedoms without discrimination. This principle was affirmed in the Charter of 
the United Nations and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights approved by 
the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10 December 1948. If one is looking 
for a genus, in order to apply the eiusdem generis rule of construction to the phrase 
"particular social group," it is to be found in the fact that the other Convention 
reasons are all grounds on which a person may be discriminated against by society. 
 
Thus, persecution is discriminatory because it is for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion. This is the reason why the Refugee 
Convention does not afford protection to those who are persecuted or ill-treated for reasons not 
covered by the five Convention grounds and the reason why the Secretary of State for the Home 
Department may grant Humanitarian Protection to those who are at real risk of suffering serious 
harm regardless of the cause of the harm.81 Persecution for reason of membership of a PSG is 
discriminatory simply because it is the membership that incites the persecutory conduct. The 
Tribunal was correct in finding that “the Geneva Convention was concerned to afford protection 
against persecution which is based on discrimination”.82 Discrimination in the context of 
international refugee protection is understood in the following terms: “persecution is 
discriminatory where its victims are targeted by virtue of attributes not shared by society as a 
whole. These attributes are listed in Article 1A(2)”.83 The element of discrimination therefore, if 
necessary for the existence of a PSG, comes into play because the persecution is for reason of 
one of the grounds listed in the Refugee Convention. 
 
Furthermore, the position in Skenderaj is supported by jurisprudence from other English 
speaking countries. The High Court of Australia clearly stated that discrimination was not an 
essential defining characteristic of a PSG.84 The treatment to which the group is subjected, 
including discrimination or persecution, may assist in identifying the group but it does not serve 
to define it and should not be an essential criterion for its existence. The High Court of Australia 
said that “while persecutory conduct cannot define the social group, the actions of the 
persecutors may serve to identify or even cause the creation of a particular social group in 
society”.85  
 
The Tribunal in SB (Moldova) considered extensive UK jurisprudence and provided the 
following propositions: (i) discrimination is not necessary to find the existence of a PSG if its 
members share a common characteristic and they are set part from the rest of society; (ii) where 
the social group is gender-based then discrimination against the gender must be shown to exist 
and that some degree of state involvement is “important”; and (iii) in cases where the immutable 
characteristic is a common background/experience which sets the group apart from the rest of 
                                                          
81 Paragraph 339C Immigration Rules (HC 395). 
82 SB (PSG - Protection Regulations – Reg 6) Moldova CG [2008] UKAIT 00002, para. 46. 
83 UNHCR’s Intervention: Islam (A.P.) v Secretary of State for the Home Department Regina v Immigration Appeal 
Tribunal and Another, Ex Parte Shah (A.P.) (Conjoined Appeals), Case for the Intervener, 25 March 1999. 
84 Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs 1997, per McHugh J. 
85 Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs 1997, per McHugh J. 
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society there is no need to demonstrate discrimination.86 In justifying point (iii) the Tribunal 
stated, in relation to former victims of trafficking that: 
 
  It would then not be necessary to show, as an identifying characteristic, that there is 
discrimination in the wider sense against the former victims of trafficking in the 
society in question. To conclude otherwise would effectively result in imposing an 
additional and unjustified hurdle on individuals (men or women) who share a 
common background or past experience of having been trafficked for the purposes of 
sexual exploitation, but not on other groups of individuals who share a common 
background or past experience, such as (for example) aristocrats.87  
 
However, this is exactly what the Tribunal has done in relation to point (ii). The Tribunal has 
imposed an additional and unjustified hurdle on women who are being persecuted because of 
their gender. In particular, as women are often persecuted by non-state actors, there are no 
reasons why they should demonstrate that there is some level of state involvement or complicity 
in order to be defined as a PSG. It is clearly established that a refugee can be recognised as such 
because s/he fears persecution from non-state actors and there is an absence of state protection.88 
The Tribunal’s approach fails to interpret the Refugee Convention in good faith that “human 
beings shall enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms without discrimination”.89  
 
The Tribunal in SB (Moldova) made the assertion that “the failure to include sex as a ground of 
persecution in the Geneva Convention, notwithstanding its inclusion as a basis of discrimination 
in article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, may be due to the fact that it is 
difficult to envisage a society in which women are actually persecuted, simply because they are 
women”.90 However, this is clearly incorrect as UK jurisprudence has accepted that women may 
be persecuted simply because they are women. Lord Bingham said in Fornah that “FGM is an 
extreme expression of the discrimination to which all women in Sierra Leone are subject”; this is 
but one example of persecution of women because they are women. The Secretary of State for 
the Home Department in the case of Fornah agreed that the nexus between the persecution and 
the PSG had been met as “FGM is a practice undertaken on women as women”.91  
 
In accordance with UNHCR Guidelines, the need to consider the existence of a PSG within the 
context of the society in question is relevant where the claimant is being imputed membership of 
a PSG. It will almost always be the case that society in general views claimants as distinct from 
the rest of society whether they are at risk of persecution in their home country on account of 
political opinion or membership of a PSG. In Shah and Islam, Lord Steyn identified the PSG as 
                                                          
86 SB (PSG - Protection Regulations – Reg 6) Moldova CG [2008] UKAIT 00002, para. 53. 
87 SB (PSG - Protection Regulations – Reg 6) Moldova CG [2008] UKAIT 00002, para. 54. 
88 Horvath v. Secretary of State for The Home Department [2000] UKHL 37 (6 July 2000). Hathaway J. Law of 
Refugee Status, (Canada: Butterworths Law, 1991), p.125. 
89 UNHCR’s Intervention: Islam (A.P.) v Secretary of State for the Home Department Regina v Immigration Appeal 
Tribunal and Another, Ex Parte Shah (A.P.) (Conjoined Appeals), Case for the Intervener, 25 March 1999. 
90 SB (PSG - Protection Regulations – Reg 6) Moldova CG [2008] UKAIT 00002, para. 46. 
91 UNHCR’s Intervention: Zainab Esther Fornah (Appellant) v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
(Respondent) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (Intervener), Case for the Intervener, 14 June 
2006, para. 21(1). 
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“women in Pakistan” on the basis that women share an immutable characteristic of gender, that 
women are discriminated against in Pakistan and that they are not protected by the state.92 There 
was no discussion of social perception in his opinion, which suggests already in this case that the 
two approaches to PSG were alternatives and not cumulative. Consequently, there is an urgent 
need to ensure that the Tribunal ends its cumulative approach to the interpretation of regulation 
6(1)(d) of the International Protection Regulations 2006 as this is contrary to the Fornah 
judgment, the UNHCR Guidelines on Membership of a Particular Social Group and the need to 
interpret the Refugee Convention in light of its object and purpose under the Vienna Convention 
and within the aim of the EU Qualification Directive. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
It is generally agreed that a correct interpretation of the Refugee Convention does not require the 
additional ground of gender to be included within the definition.93 This means that where the sole 
reason for persecution is gender-related, asylum claims are most often argued under the PSG 
ground.94 The discussion above reflects the difficulties for women who flee gender-related 
persecution and claim asylum in the UK to be recognised as refugees. This paper has highlighted 
the complexity surrounding the definition of a gender-sensitive concept of membership of a PSG 
and the resulting tension between the higher courts and the Tribunals of the Immigration and 
Asylum Chamber in the UK.  
 
In SB (Moldova) the Tribunal adopted an incorrect interpretation of Fornah and in effect applied 
a more stringent test to PSG cases based on gender. This, it could be argued is discriminatory 
and should not be followed by future Tribunals. There is nothing in the drafting materials of the 
Refugee Convention, the rules of interpretation in the English legal system or in international 
law, and domestic and international jurisprudence that suggest that where the PSG is defined by 
gender there should be an element of discrimination in the wider sense of the word against the 
group before the PSG can be found to exist. Establishing an additional criterion when the PSG is 
defined by gender is discriminatory and cannot stand.  
 
The case of Fornah is very clear on the interpretation by the Lords of article 10 of the 
Qualification Directive and the International Protection Regulations 2006 transposing the 
Directive that the protected characteristics and the social perception approaches are alternatives. 
In order words, a PSG can be defined by the members of the group sharing a characteristic that is 
immutable or that is so fundamental to their human dignity that it should not be denied, or 
alternatively by the members of the group sharing of a common characteristic, attribute, activity, 
belief, interest or goal which the society in question recognizes and which sets them apart. This 
                                                          
92 Islam v Secretary of State for the Home Department; R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Another, ex parte 
Shah [1999] UKHL 20, 25 March 1999, per Lord Steyn. 
93 Edwards, `Age and Gender dimensions in international refugee law´, 2003, p. 56. Haines R. QC, Advancing a 
gendered interpretation of the Refugee Convention: Refugee Appeal No. 76044, Presentation for the 2009 National 
Members’ Conference of the Migration Review Tribunal and Refugee Review Tribunal, 10 September 2009. 
94 Such as for example in cases of Female Genital Mutilation (FGM), see Crawley H. Refugees and Gender: Law 
and Process, (Bristol: Jordan Publishing Limited, 2001), p. 77. 
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interpretation is in line with UNHCR guidance and was adopted by the highest court in the UK. 
Decision-makers should not be concerned by floodgates arguments as the consideration of an 
asylum claim remains an individual assessment dependent on the need to demonstrate a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of a Convention ground. There are many elements to be 
met before asylum seekers are recognized as refugees and adopting an inclusive and non-
discriminatory interpretation of the Convention ground of PSG will not necessarily result in an 
increase in the grant of asylum by the UK Border Agency or allowed appeals by the Tribunal. It 
will however, ensure fairness for asylum seekers with gender-related claims within the asylum 
determination procedure. 
  
Future asylum appeal hearings in the Tribunal of the Immigration and Asylum Chamber should 
ensure an inclusive and gender-sensitive interpretation of the Refugee Convention, the 
Qualification Directive and any regulations brought in under it. The Tribunal should apply the 
same set of rules to define a PSG irrespective of the particular characteristics of the social group 
to ensure fairness and the protection of women asylum seekers who claim asylum because they 
fear persecution on account of their gender.  
 
Despite the issues examined above the courts and Tribunals in the UK have found the following 
PSG to exist: women in Pakistan;95 (intact) women in Sierra Leone;96 women in the Ivory 
Coast;97 women in Somalia;98 women in Afghanistan;99 women in Bangladesh;100 women 
charged with committing adultery in Pakistan;101 women who have committed adultery from 
Punjab, India;102 women in Kenya (and particularly Kikuyu women under the age of 65);103 
women in Liberia belonging to those ethnic groups where FGM is practiced;104 women (at risk of 
FGM) in Sudan;105 young Iranian women who refuse to enter into arranged marriages;106 lesbian 
women in Albania;107 women who do not conform to the heterosexual narrative and perceived as 
lesbians in Jamaica;108 former victims of trafficking in Moldova, Nigeria, Thailand, Albania and 
China.109  
                                                          
95 Islam v Secretary of State for the Home Department; R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Another, ex parte 
Shah [1999] UKHL 20, 25 March 1999. 
96 Secretary of State for the Home Department v K; Fornah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] 
UKHL 46, 18 October 2006. 
97 MD (Women) Ivory Coast CG [2010] UKUT 215 (IAC). 
98 HM (Somali Women, Particular Social Group) Somalia [2005] UKIAT 00040. 
99 NS (Social Group – Women – Forced marriage) Afghanistan CG [2004] UKIAT 00328. 
100 SA (Divorced woman – illegitimate child) Bangladesh CG [2011] UKUT 00254(IAC). 
101 KA and Others (domestic violence – risk on return) Pakistan CG [2010] UKUT 216 (IAC). 
102 BK (Risk – Adultery -PSG) India CG [2002] UKIAT 03387. 
103 P & Anor v Secretary of State for Home Department [2004] EWCA Civ 1640. 
104 SK (FGM – ethnic groups) Liberia CG [2007] UKAIT 00001. 
105 FM (FGM) Sudan CG [2007] UKAIT00060. 
106 TB (PSG – women) Iran [2005] UKIAT 00065. 
107 MK (Lesbians) Albania CG [2009] UKAIT 00036. 
108 SW (lesbians – HJ and HT applied) Jamaica CG [2011] UKUT 00251(IAC). 
109 SB (PSG - Protection Regulations – Reg 6) Moldova CG [2008] UKAIT 00002. PO (Trafficked Women) Nigeria 
CG [2009] UKAIT 00046. Note that this case has partly been overturned by the Court of Appeal in PO (Nigeria) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWCA Civ 132 but on other issues not concerned with PSG. AZ 
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These are welcome developments which may afford some level of protection for women who 
flee gender-related persecution in their countries of origin. However, the failure by the Tribunal 
to apply the findings by the Lords in Fornah and by the Court of Appeal in Skenderaj means that 
the definition of a PSG is an issue which is likely to continue to be highly litigated, to the 
detriment of women asylum seekers who seek international protection in the UK on the basis of 
their gender. Finally, it is important to remember that the Refugee Convention grounds of 
political opinion or religion may be relevant where women are persecuted because they refuse to 
comply with or are seen to transgress social mores110 even though this was recommended as 
falling within the ground of PSG by the UNHCR Executive Committee in 1985.111 More than 
twenty-five years later, women must be recognised as active agents where relevant and not 
necessarily as passive members of a social group. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(Trafficked women) Thailand CG [2010] UKUT 118 (IAC). AM and BM (Trafficked women) Albania CG [2010] 
UKUT 80 (IAC). HC & RC (Trafficked women) China CG [2009] UKAIT 00027. 
110 Crawley, Refugees and Gender: Law and Process, 2001, p. 73. Haines, QC, Advancing a gendered interpretation 
of the Refugee Convention: Refugee Appeal No. 76044, 2009. This is being done in New Zealand, see Yahyaoui 
Krivenko, `Muslim women’s claims to refugee status within the context of child custody upon divorce under Islamic 
Law´, 2010, p. 63. 
111 EXCOM Conclusion on Refugee Women and International Protection, No. 39 (XXXVI) – 1985, para. (k). 
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